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David Slater has always been a great inspiration for me. His concern has been 
that economists should strive to connect deep theoretical thinking with 
practical affairs and public policy. This is an old view of the role of the 
economist in society, one that Maynard Keynes, in particular, carried to its 
highest accomplishment in the twentieth century. It is an old view not in the 
sense of being passé, but of being a firmly established and ever relevant view 
of what our profession is about. I get comfort in seeing the best and brightest 
among our colleagues still advise governments, work for governments and 
even engage in politics. In my generation, Olivier Blanchard, Willem Buiter, 
Stan Fischer, Pedro Malan, John McCallum and Larry Summers are good 
examples to watch. 
Speaking of Keynes, David remained inspiringly Keynesian through the 
1970s and 1980s, when conservative ideology came to dominate thinking in 
economic theory and policy and Keynes was repeatedly pronounced dead. I 
am referring to Friedman’s monetarism, to Lucas’ equilibrium business cycles 
based on price misperceptions and to Prescott’s real business cycles based on 
productivity shocks. Conservative macroeconomics eventually petered out 
both on empirical grounds and against the counterattacks of New Keynesians 
such as Akerlof, Blanchard, Grandmont and Stiglitz. As Paul Krugman (1994, 
p. 197) nicely put it, Keynes has proved to be the “Energizer Bunny” of  
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economics. Greenspan’s brand of success at the helm of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve owes almost everything to Keynes, and almost nothing to the 
conservative icons of those two dark decades. David had it right all along. His 
common sense helped many of us weather the passing storm. 
David has also been helpful in a more personal way by inviting me to be 
a member of the Economic Council of Canada in 1985, and a member of the 
Board of Directors of the Centre for the Study of Living Standards in 1995. 
He has even guided my judgement in the preparation of this short paper. My 
understanding of the regional implications of Canadian military expenditures 
during the Second World War, which I explain below, owes much to his deep 







My subject is Quebec’s relative growth performance since World War II. In 
his seminal 1971 contribution to the study of Canadian regional growth from 
Confederation to 1956, Alan Green stated: “In spite of its high degree of 
industrialization coupled with its locational advantages, Quebec has remained 
consistently below the national average and below that of its neigh-bour, 
Ontario. Why this divergence in Quebec and why its persistence are still 
largely unsolved mysteries” (Green, 1971, p. 44). He ended his study by 
emphasizing again: “A search for answers to this problem would seem 
imperative” (Green, 1971, p. 68). 
The question raised by Green about Quebec is the primary motivation for 
this paper. While, mainly due to paucity of data, I will not answer his 
question about the province’s lack of economic convergence towards Ontario 
before the 1960s, I will nevertheless show that a solid convergence process 
was at long last underway at the very moment Green’s book appeared in the 
early 1970s. There is also another motivation behind this paper. In the last 
three years, two popular books by Jean-Luc Migué (1998) and Gilles Paquet 
(1999) and a widely-quoted policy paper by Marcel Boyer (2001) have 
produced very negative assessments  of Quebec’s post-Quiet Revolution 
economic performance. All three essays are motivated by various political 
agendas. I will not discuss them in detail, but essentially “do my thing”. It will 
be clear from the empirical results I report that I am more sanguine about 
Quebec’s economic performance and prospects than those authors are. The 
key difference between my view and theirs is that, where they see an empty 
glass, I see it as already half-full and still filling.  




The Bottom Line 
 
 
It is an easy matter to show that the Quiet Revolution (QR) has been accom-
panied by faster per capita economic growth in Quebec than in Ontario. The 
summary evidence is presented in Figure 1. The figure provides a “difference 
in differences” picture of the trend in Quebec’s real domestic income per 
capita as a percentage of Ontario’s back to 1926.
1 The long-term picture is 
clear. From the late 1920s to the late 1950s, there was decline and stagnation 
in Quebec’s relative standard of living — exactly as observed by Green. 
Beginning at 78 per cent of Ontario under Taschereau in the late 1920s, 
Quebec’s relative position ended the 1950s at 74 per cent of its neighbour 
under the Duplessis regime. Conversely, in the last 40 years the standard-of-
living gap between Quebec and Ontario has shrunk. It fell to 14 per cent in 
1999 from 26 per cent in 1960. This translates into an average gap-narrow-
ing rate of 1.8 per cent per year over the last four decades. By international 
historical standards, this is neither slow nor rapid convergence, but just 
average speed (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999). Migué (1998) has 
recently stated that Quebec did relatively well in the pre-QR period, and 
characterizes the post-QR period as one of relative economic decline and 
stagnation for the province.
2 Figure 1 shows that the exact opposite is true: 
                                                             
1Real domestic income per capita is calculated as the linked series for provincial 
personal income less government transfer payments to persons (for 1926–1961) and gross 
domestic product (for 1961–2000) divided by the total population and the consumer price 
index (CPI) for Montreal or Toronto. The CPI ratio between Quebec and Ontario is 
multiplied by the factor 0.972, reflecting estimated purchasing power parity in the base year 
1992. 
2Migué states that pre-QR per capita growth in Quebec was “parallel” to Ontario 
growth. He does not realize that this defines exactly the nature of the pre-QR problem raised 
by Green: lack of convergence before 1960. He omits looking at the entire 1926–60 and 
1960–99 periods, but instead selects sample periods, such as 1946–58 or 1994–98, that 
(perhaps inadvertently) suit his argument. In making interprovincial comparisons, he 
sometimes neglects deflating aggregate activity by population. He compares investment, 
productivity and employment trends across provinces without paying attention to widely 
different population growth rates. He often emphasizes remaining gaps between Quebec and 
Ontario, but does not report whether those gaps have been widening or narrowing. 
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Figure 1: Real Domestic Income Per Capita,  
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Source: Statistics Canada and author’s calculations. 
 
it is the earlier period that was one of decline and stagnation, and the more 
recent period that has been one of relative growth and catch-up. QED. 
This does not end the discussion, however. First, two important 
anomalies must be recognized and explained: the sharp drop between 1939 
and 1945, and the big bubble of 1975–85. Second, the sources of the long-
term convergence since the late 1950s must be identified and understood. 
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First Anomaly: The Second World War 
 
 
The first of the two anomalies is the big drop in the standard-of-living ratio 
between Quebec and Ontario during the Second World War, which can be 
seen in Figure 1. The ratio dropped sharply from 74 per cent in 1939 to 67 
per cent in 1945, and then suddenly climbed back to 74 per cent in 1947. The 
likely explanation is the regional pattern of military expenditures during the 
war, which turned out to be highly skewed against Quebec. Military pay was 
about $3 million each in Quebec, Ontario and the rest of the country in 1938. 
By 1945, it had increased to around $100 million in Quebec and $500 million 
each in Ontario and the rest of Canada. Compared to a proportional sharing 
of military pay according to regional population, this constituted a major 
redistributive shock amounting to 10 per cent of Quebec’s personal income. 
This is more than enough to explain the relative drop of the Quebec economy 
during the war. Quebec men paid very dearly for their reluctance to enrol in 
the armed forces. The lack of data by province makes it difficult to say 
anything about the regional distribution of other war expenditures and the 
regional concentration of the military-industrial complex. 
Another temporary drop in Quebec’s relative economic performance 
occurred from 1948 to 1951. This remains a puzzle. Confirming the picture in 
Figure 1 at the manufacturing level, Raynauld (1961, Table 26) reports that 
the ratio of manufacturing value-added per employee between Quebec and 
Ontario fell sharply from an average of 92 per cent in 1943–46 to 85 per cent 
in 1948–51. This was clearly not caused by a similar regional distortion of 
military pay during the Korean War. Such a distortion simply did not occur. 
Another candidate for an explanation would be some regional unbalance 
resulting from C.D. Howe’s postwar reconstruction policies. It is not known 
whether these factors can account for the 1948–51 drop, or the persistent 
lack of convergence of Quebec’s productivity towards Ontario’s for the rest 




Second Anomaly: The Big Bubble of 1975–85 
 
 
The second anomaly that stands out in Figure 1 is the big bubble in Quebec’s 
relative performance that took place between 1975 and 1985. Over the four 
years, 1975–78, Quebec’s real income per capita shot up from 79 per cent to 
86 per cent of Ontario’s. It stayed at about this level over the next four years  
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until 1982, and then receded to around 83 per cent by 1985. Understanding 
what happened in this period is key to interpreting the long-term trend 
correctly. Does the fact that in 1999 Quebec’s income, at 86 per cent of 
Ontario’s, was no higher than in 1978 imply that the 20-year period, 1979–
99, was one of relative stagnation for the province, as argued by Boyer 
(2001), for example? Or should the entire period 1975–85 be, for some 
reason, considered as an outlier, and the 1986–99 period seen as a return to 
the pre-existing, long-term trend established before 1975? 
The big push of 1975–78 was first underlined by Gérard Bélanger (1980) 
and further analyzed by Paul Davenport (1981). Both authors pointed out 
that faster labour productivity growth in Quebec than in Ontario was the main 
factor behind Quebec’s startling relative income performance in that four-year 
period. It then looked as if Quebec had escaped the worldwide slowdown in 
productivity that had begun around 1973. This is supported by Figure 2, 
which shows that Quebec’s labour productivity increased from 89 per cent of 
Ontario’s in 1974 to 98 per cent in 1978. The Quebec-Ontario ratio stayed 
around this level over the next three years, and then peaked at 101 per cent in 
1982. Then, over the next 17 years, Quebec’s relative productivity trended 
down, reaching 93 per cent in 1999.
3 
                                                             
3Labour productivity is calculated as real gross domestic product (GDP) divided by 
employment from the Labour Force Survey. The Quebec-Ontario real GDP ratio is 
obtained through division of the Quebec-Ontario nominal GDP ratio by the Quebec-Ontario 
CPI ratio adjusted for purchasing power parity. To the extent that the interprovincial CPI 
ratio differs from the interprovincial ratio of implicit GDP deflators, the resulting statistic is not 
true relative labour produc-tivity, but the product of true relative labour productivity and 
relative terms of trade (where, by a slight abuse of language, “terms of trade” is taken to 
mean the ratio between the implicit GDP deflator and the CPI). In 1954–60, GDP is 
replaced by personal income.  
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Bélanger and Davenport had two opposite conjectures to interpret the 
1975–78 development. Bélanger thought r elative productivity was high 
because relative real wages were high. Davenport thought relative real wages 
were high because relative productivity was high. We all know, of course, 
that labour productivity and real wages are closely connected endogenous 
variables that reflect interactive firm and employee behaviour. This is borne 
out by a comparison of Figure 2 with Figure 3, which traces relative wage 
trends back to 1961.
4 Relative labour productivity and relative real wages 
tend to follow broadly similar  time paths through much short-term 
wandering.
5  
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that Bélanger’s conjecture was the 
correct one. The supporting evidence is both qualitative and quantitative. The 
qualitative evidence is historical. The mid- to late 1 970s were years of 
extreme tension in Quebec’s labour markets and labour relations. A large 
number of major construction projects were proceeding simultaneously (the 
James Bay Project, the Montreal Olympics, the Mirabel Airport, the Montreal 
Metro, etc.). Very generous wage settlements were granted in the provincial 
public sector in 1975 and 1979. There was civil disobedience, union leaders 
were thrown in prison, the La Grande Dam construction site was sacked, a 
provincial task force was commissioned to investigate corrup-tion and 
violence in the construction industry, and the province by far led the country 
— if not the world — for the annual number of days lost per worker due to 
labour conflicts. Labour reforms were very favourable to the union side, 
social policy was expanding rapidly, and the provincial minimum wage 
reached almost 60 per cent of the average wage. These developments are 
entirely consistent with the wage explosion that occurred in 1975–78, was 
sustained until 1982, and momentarily brought average weekly earnings in 
Quebec to exceed those in Ontario in both nominal and real terms (Figure 3). 
                                                             
4Average real weekly earnings are calculated as average weekly earnings divided 
by the CPI adjusted for purchasing power parity. Deflation by the CPI instead of the implicit 
GDP deflator justifies the same note of caution as for the definition of relative labour 
productivity. There is a break in the average weekly earnings series in 1983, when coverage 
was broadened to cover the public sector and firms of smaller sizes. The old and the new 
series are linked in that year. 
5The two curves should not be expected to coincide in any given region. There is 
much short-term wandering, measurement error could be significant, and the degree of 
competition in product and labour markets as well as the technological-organizational 
connection between labour and output can differ significantly across regions. 
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Figure 2: Labour Productivity (real GDP per worker) 
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Chart 2
Labour productivity (real GDP per worker)








Source: Statistics Canada and author's
calculations.  
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Figure 3: Average Real Weekly Earnings,  
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Chart 3
Average real weekly earnings,





























































Source: Statistics Canada and author’s calculations. 
 
The quantitative evidence is based on the identifying behaviour of the 
employment rate, the profit share and the capital-labour ratio. First, Quebec’s 
employment rate dropped sharply from 90 per cent of Ontario’s in 1975 to 85 
per cent in 1982 (see Figure 4).
6 Second, the corporate profit share in Quebec 
plummetted from 93 per cent of its Ontario counterpart in 1961–73 to 72 per 
cent in 1981–86, once the effects of the wage explosion could no longer be 
                                                             
6The employment rate of the working-age population is the fraction of that 
population who are employed. For 1946–66, the working-age population is defined as the 
population aged 14 and over. For 1966–2000, it is the population aged 15 and over. The 
two series are linked in 1966.  
390  Pierre Fortin 
masked by the pre-1981 cyclical expansion (see Figure 5).
7 Third, consistent 
with the slump in relative profits, Quebec’s capital-labour ratio stopped rising 
as a percentage of Ontario’s and began to decline after reaching its peak in 
1982 (see Figure 6).
8 The crucial point is that in each case the medium-term 
trend is consistent with the occurrence of a relative wage push, and just the 
opposite of what one would expect from a favourable relative productivity 
shock. The latter would have been accompanied by increases in relative 
employment, profit share and capital-labour intensity (see Blanchard, 2000, 
among others). The focus on the medium-term trend is crucial here. Owing to 
the large ongoing investment projects, the cyclical expansion was much 
stronger in Quebec than in Ontario in the second half of the 1970s. The 
extent of disequilibrium introduced by the wage explosion was therefore 
hidden for a while. 
The Bélanger hypothesis on the role played by exogenous institutional 
and policy developments can be extended to interpret post-1982 trends in 
productivity and wages, which both headed downward. Again, the evidence is 
historical-qualitative and quantitative. Historically, it can be argued that the 
1982 recession, which was much more devastating in Quebec than in Ontario, 
became a sort of “day of reckoning” for the union movement and the  
                                                             
7The corporate profit share is equal to corporate profits before taxes as a share of 
net domestic income. 
8The capital-labour ratio is the capital stock per person employed. It is defined as 
net non-residential private and public capital stock in constant 1992 dollars divided by total 
employment. The capital stock is depreciated through the (infinite) geometric depreciation 
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Figure 4: Employment Rate of the Working-age Population, 
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Chart 4
Employment rate of the working-age population,








Source: Statistics Canada and author's
calculations.  













392  Pierre Fortin 
Figure 5: Corporate Profit Share,  
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Chart 5
Corporate profit share,
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Figure 6: Capital-Labour Ratio,  
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Chart 6
Capital-labour ratio,








Source: Statistics Canada and author's calculations.
 
Source: Statistics Canada and author’s calculations. 
 
 
provincial government. The right to strike was severely restricted by the 
Essential Services Act, the 1983 public sector bargaining round brought a 
stinging defeat for unions with spillovers to the private sector, rank-and-file 
members began to require unions to focus less on wage increases and more 
on job security, labour conflicts suddenly became less frequent and shorter in 
Quebec than in Ontario, the Solidarity Fund of the Quebec Federation of 
Labour became an important supplier of venture capital, social policy became 
more prudent, and the provincial minimum wage was frozen for an extended 
period. Somewhat like the Netherlands after 1982 and Ireland after 1987, 
Quebec after 1982 entered a prolonged period of wage moderation and 
peaceful labour relations. Simultaneously, it seems that wages and labour 
relations in Ontario came under stress under the Peterson and Rae govern- 
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ments, which reinforced the downward trend in the Quebec-Ontario real 
wage ratio. 
The quantitative evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that 
declining relative wages caused declining relative productivity after 1982, 
instead of the reverse. Again, the identifying variables are the employment 
rate, the profit share and the capital-labour ratio. There were favourable 
turnarounds in all three variables. First, Quebec’s relative employment rate 
stopped declining and began to increase right after 1982. From 85 per cent in 
that year, the Quebec-Ontario employment-rate ratio rose to 92 per cent in 
the second half of the 1990s (Figure 4). This is two points higher than the 
1961–74 pre-wage explosion average of 90 per cent. Figure 7 brings 
additional supporting evidence from unemployment behaviour. The average 
unemployment-rate gap between the two provinces rose from 2.2 points in 
1965–76 to four points in 1977–90. It then declined again to 2.7 points in 
1991–2000.
9 Second, beginning in the second half of the 1980s, the Quebec 
income share of corporate profits regained much of the ground lost pre-
viously against Ontario. Starting from 74 per cent in 1986, the ratio of profit 
shares eventually came to exceed 85 per cent in 1989. It has hovered around 
that level through the 1990s (Figure 5). Third, Quebec’s relative capital-
labour ratio finally stopped declining in 1992. Since then, it has trended 
upward slightly (Figure 6). 
Let me summarize the argument. The “second anomaly” in Quebec’s 
global economic performance since 1926 took the form of a temporary 
bubble above trend for relative income per capita around 1975–85 (see Figure 
1). The proposed story is one of strong cyclical expansion accom-panied by a 
wage explosion in the second half of the 1970s, and followed by a return to 
wage moderation after the 1982 recession. The wage explosion was a major 
economic disturbance, but its deleterious effects on employment, profits and 
capital formation were temporarily hidden by the short-term expansion until 
the recession struck in 1982. The depth of the recession forced the union 
movement and the provincial government to finally acknowledge the damage. 
At that point, they realized that a return to wage moderation and improved 
labour relations was essential for a recovery of employment, profitability and 
capital formation. Winding down the wage excesses of the 1970s was a long 
process. It took until the 1990s before employment, profits and capital 
intensity were really back on track, relatively speaking. The Quebec economy 
was much better prepared to weather the 1991 recession than the 1982 
                                                             
9The unemployment rate of the labour force is the number of persons who want to 
work but are without jobs expressed as a fraction of all those who want to work.  
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recession. In fact, contrary to much of what could be read at the time in the 
national press (including horrifying tales of Sainte-Catherine Street being 
literally shut down), employment took a much  
 
Figure 7: Quebec-Ontario Unemployment Rate Gap, 
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Source: Statistics Canada and author's
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smaller hit in Quebec than Ontario during the 1991 recession and its 
aftermath. 
A blind focus on the 20 years of observations, 1979–1999, in Figure 1 
would seem to imply that this entire period was one of relative stagnation for 
Quebec. This is a mistaken view. The key implication of the discussion has 
been that there was a major wage explosion in the second half of the 1970s, 
which was later repaired by persistent wage moderation in the 1980s and 
1990s. This means that the entire period, 1975–85, should be, for this reason,  
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considered as an outlier involving a major, but temporary bubble in relative 
performance. In this interpretation, the Quebec economy after 1985 should 
be seen as reverting to its pre-1975 rising long-term relative trend, shown as a 
dotted line in Figure 1. 
 
 
Accounting for Convergence Since 1960 
 
 
Let us now return to the bottom line. Quebec’s real domestic income per 
capita increased from 74 per cent of Ontario’s in 1960 to 86 per cent in 1999. 
In log points, this means exactly half of the initial Quebec-Ontario gap was 
closed in four decades.
10 To better understand this development, it is 
instructive to decompose real income per capita into its three sources: 
productivity, employment and demographics. There are indeed three ways for 
a population to get richer: producing more per worker, putting more adults to 
work, and making less babies. In pure accounting terms, this follows from the 
canonical decomposition: 
 
Y/N = (Y/E)(E/A)(A/N) , 
 
where Y = real GDP, E = employment, A = working-age population, N = 
total population. The three ratios are: Y/E = labour productivity, E/A = 
employment rate, and A/N = working-age ratio (the percentage of the total 
population who are of working age). Let us examine, in reverse order, how 
each ratio has contributed to the gap-narrowing process. 
First, beginning in the early 1960s, the baby-boomers began to enter the 
working-age population in large numbers. They also made a lot less babies 
than their parents. The baby boom was followed by a baby bust. With more 
persons of working age and fewer children to feed, the working-age ratio A/N 
increased. This gave an automatic upward lift to income per capita Y/N. The 
demographic windfall was more pronounced in Quebec than in Ontario 
because Quebec’s fertility rate started at a higher level and landed at a lower 
level than Ontario’s. Figure 8 shows that Quebec’s working-age ratio rose 
swiftly from 92 per cent of Ontario’s in the mid-1950s to 101 per cent in the 
late 1970s.
11 It has stayed around this level ever since. A not-insignificant 35 
                                                             
10Since [log(.74)]/[log(.86)] = 0.501. 
11The working-age ratio expresses the population aged 14 and over (in 1946–65) 
or 15 and over (1966–99) as a percentage of the total population.  
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per cent of the 1960–99 increase in Quebec’s relative income per capita can 
be attributed to this demographic shift. 
 
Figure 8: Working-Age Ratio,  
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Chart 8
Working-age ratio,








Source: Statistics Canada and author's calculations.
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Making fewer babies is not the most glorious way to increase a region’s 
standard of living, but it is an inevitable mathematical consequence. It is also 
a temporary one. The phenomenon will reverse itself when the baby-boomers 
begin to retire in large numbers around 2010. Less adults to work will tend to 
slow down Quebec’s income growth. Moreover, the province will be harder 
hit by this reversal because it will age more rapidly than other regions. 
Second, the trend in Quebec’s relative employment rate (the E/N ratio), 
already reported in Figure 4, initially deteriorated from 1953 to 1960. This 
development owes much to the fact that women’s labour force participation  
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began to increase much later in Quebec than Ontario, but is also due to the 
better performance of the job market in Ontario, as underlined by the rise in 
the unemployment-rate gap between the two provinces in that period. Except 
for the spike around Expo 67, the next 15 years until 1974 witnessed some 
stability in the Quebec-Ontario employment-rate ratio, at around 90 per cent. 
Then came the big drop to 85 per cent in 1982, followed by the recovery to 
92 per cent up to the second half of the 1990s, which I have already linked to 
the wage explosion of 1975–78 and the post-1982 climate of wage 
moderation.
12 Rising educational standards and the concomitant catch-up in 
the labour force participation rate of Quebec women were also important 
movers of the relative employment rate in the last two decades. 
On net between 1960 and 1999, the increase in  Quebec’s relative 
employment rate was less than two points — from 90 per cent to 91.5 per 
cent. The four-decade contribution of the rise in relative employment to 
narrowing the income gap with Ontario is therefore small — about 10 per 
cent. However, that contribution has been of major significance in the more 
recent, post-1982 period. It has been strong enough to more than offset the 
downward adjustment in relative labour productivity (Figure 2) and allow 
relative real income per capita to continue to rise on trend after 1985 (Figure 
1). 
Relative labour productivity is the third factor that has contributed to the 
narrowing of the income gap. It has been responsible for the remaining 55 per 
cent of the process. It can be seen in Figure 2 that the Quebec-Ontario 
productivity ratio (which may also include a relative terms-of-trade element) 
increased from 86 per cent in 1960 to 93 per cent in 1999. This means the 
Quebec-Ontario productivity gap declined at the average rate of 2 per cent 
per year over the 39-year period, 1960–99. Again, this is neither slow nor fast 
by international historical standards (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999). The 
growth in relative productivity has not always been smooth. Relative 
productivity increased rather smoothly from 83 per cent in 1954 to 89 per 
cent in 1974, then spiked at 101 per cent in 1982, and has since adjusted 
downward to 93 per cent in 1999. Just as in the case of relative employment, 
movements in relative productivity after 1974 can be related to the peculiar 
sequence of wage explosion and wage moderation observed in Quebec over 
the last quarter-century. One factor that has retarded the increase in relative 
                                                             
12Due to its slow population growth, Quebec can see its employment rate increase 
faster than in other regions even if its share of national employment growth is smaller than its 
share of the Canadian population. This continues to cause much confusion about Quebec’s 
relative employment situation in public and media discussions.  
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productivity is the emigration of hundreds of thousands of highly-skilled 
anglophones between 1960 and 1980. Since many of them settled in Ontario, 







What are the prospects for a continuation of convergence in the future? The 
demographic outlook is for stability in Quebec’s working-age ratio relative to 
Ontario’s. Further, there are no indications that the current social peace and 
good industrial relations are about to end. Hence, the future behaviour of 
productivity and employment will be the key determinant of relative 
economic convergence. In turn, this will depend on Quebec’s relative 
propensity to save and to invest in education, infrastructures and equipment, 
and research and development. I now survey Quebec’s performance in each 
of these three areas. 
First, concerning education, Table 1 uses data from the Canadian census 
and the U.S. Current Population Survey compiled by Lemieux (1999) to 
compare schooling trends in Quebec, Ontario and the United States in 1991 
for three cohorts of men born in 1926, 1946 and 1966. Quebec men born in 
1926 spent almost two years less in school than Ontario men of the same 
generation. In fact, their level of schooling was less than black American men 
of the same age. The Quebec-Ontario schooling gap began to shrink with the 
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Table 1: Average Number of Years of Schooling in 1991 of  
   Men Born in 1926, 1946 and 1966, Quebec, Ontario  
























































Source: Lemieux (1999, p. 53). 
about a year of schooling less than Ontario men. Incidentally, this constitutes 
evidence that the winds of change had already been blowing for a while in 
Quebec when the Quiet Revolution began “officially” in 1960. Eventually,  
the Quebec-Ontario gap was closed entirely with the generation born in 1966. 
Overall, from the 1926 cohort to the 1966 cohort, the average level of 
schooling increased by five years in Quebec and by three years in Ontario. In 
both provinces, years of schooling for the 1966 generation exceed the 
corresponding U.S. level by one year. Updates from Statistics Canada’s 
Labour Force Survey indicate that in the fall of 2000 school attendance 
among the 15–19 population was 85 per cent in Quebec and 86 per cent in 
Ontario. Among the 20–24 population, the figures were 40 per cent in 
Quebec and 42 per cent in Ontario. There seems to be already near-complete 
educational convergence among the younger generations of the two 
provinces. 
Given the close connection between education levels and the employment 
rate, the closing of the schooling gap between Quebec and Ontario since the 
1950s must have played a major role in the turnaround of Quebec’s relative 
employment rate begun in the 1980s. Further, there should be more to come. 
As older, less educated generations are progressively replaced by younger, 
more educated generations, we should see the Quebec-Ontario employment-
rate gap continue to shrink over the medium to long term. In 2000, for 
example, the employment rate for men aged 50 to 64 in Quebec was only 89 
per cent of that in Ontario. But for men aged 30 to 49, the Quebec-Ontario 
ratio was 95 per cent. The same kind of cohort-based evidence is available  
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for the unemployment rate. In this case, the Quebec-Ontario gap was 3.8 
percentage points for the 50–64 age group, and 2.5 points for the 30–49 
group. This is indicative of future decreases in the interregional 
unemployment-rate gap. Of course, these are “other-things-equal” projec-
tions. The future should never be taken for granted. Much will depend on 
success in reducing illiteracy and dropout rates further and in improving the 
general quality of education. 
The second area to look at is investment in infrastructures and 
equipment. Figure 6 can be interpreted as broad evidence that Quebec does 
not lag behind Ontario in equipping its labour force with non-residential 
productive capital. Quebec’s capital-labour ratio is relatively high, in particular 
due to heavy investment in hydro-electric dam sites in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The most worrisome trend here is that the investment-to-GDP ratio has 
trended down both provincially and nationally since the 1950s. The main 
challenge for the future is to redress the situation by adopting policies 
supportive of saving and investment, such as raising RRSP limits, incurring 
fiscal surpluses, shifting public expenditures towards infrastructure 
development, and making the tax and general economic environment more 
competitive. 
The third and final sensitive area for growth is investment in reasearch 
and development. Regional data on direct R&D spending begin only in 1979. 
The available time series for Quebec and Ontario are graphed in Figure 9 as 
percentages of GDP. The evidence they provide is that direct spending on 
R&D as a percentage of GDP grew faster in Quebec than Ontario between 
1979 and 1997. Quebec’s R&D spending-to-GDP ratio overtook Ontario’s 
beginning in 1995. This is rather impressive, given that all federal R&D 
spending made in Ottawa are included in the Ontario total. There is, in 
particular, a strong concentration of high-tech industries in the Montreal area, 
supported by favourable federal and provincial tax and grant policies. This 
bodes well for the future, although one wonders whether enough attention has 
been paid so far to encouraging the diffusion of domestic and foreign new 
technology across firms and industries, as opposed to generating new 
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Figure 9: Direct R&D Spending as a Share of GDP, 
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Chart 9
Direct R&D spending as a share of GDP,































































Source: Statistics Canada and author’s calculations. 
 
 
If Quebec has already caught up with Ontario in education, infra-
structures and equipment, and R&D spending, one must wonder why its real 
GDP per capita is still less than 90 per cent of Ontario’s. Part of the answer 
lies in the very long gestation period required before the educational 
revolution filters through all age groups. Part also probably lies in in-complete 
technology diffusion. And, as suggested by the trend in Figure 5, business 
profitability in Quebec could still be insufficient. Little can be done about the 
first problem — only waiting for time to go by — but the last two need to be 








Thirty years ago, Alan Green (1971) wondered why Quebec had not been 
able to narrow the gap with Ontario’s standard of living between 
Confederation and the mid-1950s. We still do not have a definitive answer to 
this question. But in this paper, I have reported evidence showing that the 
process of narrowing the gap did at long last begin to take place at the end of 
the 1950s, and was already making good progress at the time Green was 
writing. 
In contrast, the pessimistic view has recently circulated that the Quebec 
economy was doing rather well before the Quiet Revolution, and has since 
gone through a period of stagnation and decline (Migué, 1998; Paquet, 1999; 
Boyer, 2001). I report evidence that shows the exact opposite is true. In 
terms of real income per capita, the Quebec economy was in relative decline 
from the late 1920s to the late 1950s, and has grown comparatively faster 
than the Ontario economy on average since the Quiet Revolution. Quebec’s 
real income per capita increased from 74 per cent of Ontario’s in 1960 to 86 
per cent in 1999. Therefore, half of the standard-of-living gap between 
Quebec and Ontario observed by Green was closed over those 40 years. 
By international historical standards, this is neither slow nor rapid 
convergence — just average speed. A standard decomposition of real income 
per capita into its canonical sources indicates that demographics, employ-
ment and productivity have all contributed on net to the narrowing of the 
Quebec-Ontario gap over the last four decades — for 35 per cent, 10 per cent 
and 55 per cent, respectively. 
There have been major ups and down in the catch-up process. One 
anomaly is that Quebec’s standard of living dropped sharply during the 
Second World War. This can be attributed to a major redistributive shock 
amounting to 10 per cent of Quebec’s personal income. There was a huge 
distortion in the regional sharing of military pay, due to the reluctance of 
Quebec men to enrol in the armed forces. 
Another anomaly is the big bubble in Quebec’s relative performance that 
took place between 1975 and 1985. I have taken some time to show that both 
the qualitative and quantitative evidence point to a major wage explosion 
occurring in the second half of the 1970s. Its deleterious effects were initially 
masked by a strong cyclical expansion, but revealed clearly during the 1982 
recession. After that recession, a prolonged period of wage moderation and 
more peaceful labour relations began, which has lasted up to this day. The 
1986–99 period saw a return of Quebec’s relative performance to the pre-
existing, long-term trend established before 1975. This recent period has been  
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marked by a important recovery of employment, following the trough of 
1982. 
Prospects for a continuation of Quebec-Ontario convergence in the future 
are good, but nothing should be taken for granted. Quebec’s invest-ment 
performance in education, infrastructures and equipment, and research and 
development is not very different from Ontario’s. Much will depend on 
success in reducing illiteracy and dropout rates further and improving the 
general quality of education. There is also progress to be made in the area of 
technology diffusion. Finally, business profitability in Quebec is still com-
paratively low. The province would benefit from various policies that would 
support saving and investment, such as raising RRSP limits, incurring fiscal 
surpluses, shifting public expenditures towards infrastructure development, 
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